The Solomon report; America's ruthless blueprint for the assimilation of Micronesia.

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Ruthless

for the

M KM

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Published jointly by
Friends of Micronesia
Micronesian Independent
Tia Belau

The Setting

1. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands — or Mic-
ronesia — comprises the forxc-r Japanese mandated Carol-
ine, Marshall and ' Mariana Islands. Scattered over an
area as large as the mainland of the US, those 2,100 is-
lands, less than 1 00 of which are inhabited by the ter- ■
ritorv's 8*, 000 people, came under United States contro 1
first by conquest and then, in 1947, under a trusteeship
agreement with the Security Council of the UN. The is-
lands vary from low coral atolls to higher islands of vol-
canic origin, the largest land masses being Babelthuap in
the Palau district with 153 square miles, Ponape with 129
square miles and Saipan with 46 square miles. Population
distribution ranges from islands with a few families to
Saipan with 7,800, Ponape with 11 ,500 and Truk with 15,

COO.

With a variety of racial mixtures, languages and cul-
tures, essentially a series of individual island com-
munities rather than a unified society, a lack of human
and natural resources, tremendously difficult communica-
tions and transportation, the area has presented very ser-
ious administrative and developmental problems to the US.
Historically, life has centered around the village, the
extended family or clan and its lands. The traditional
systems of communal, rather than individual land owner-
ship, of inheritance through matril ineal lines and of the
selection of native chiefs continue side-by-side with the
forms of democratic institutions introduced by the U. S.
For a variety of reasons, in the almost twenty years of
US control, physical facilities have further deteriorated
in many areas, the economy has remained relatively dor-
mant and in many ways retrogressed while progress toward
social development has been slow. The people remainlarge-
1 ,- ill. '.crate and inadequately prepared to participate
in jo'ii + kvi, ccraercial and other activities of more
t! an a ruoime-narv character. The great majority depend
largely upon subsistence agriculture — fruit and nut
gathers — and tishing. As a result, cntin^ o f t^ P
trusteeship '-as been qrowiro i" ihe UN and the Li3
p ress __ gr,d certain ways, among Micronesiar.s.

2. Despite a lack of serious concern for the area un-
til suite recently, Micronesia is said to be essential to
tr? IS for security reasons, We cannot give the area up,
yet +i,Tu is running out for the US in the sense that we
will soon be the only nation left administering a trust
territory. The time could come, and shortly, when the
pressures in the UN for a settlement of the status of itlic-
rones i a could become more than embarrassing.

In recognition of the problem, the President, on April
18, 1962, approved NASM No. 145 which set forth as US
policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent re-
lationship with the US within our political framework, ifr
Keeping with that goal, the memorandum called for acceler-
ated development of the area to bring its political, eco-
nomic and social standards into line with an eventual psr-
;ca'en> association.

Ihe memorandum also established a Task Force to con-
sider what action might be taken to accomplish our goal:
and to provide policy and program advice to the Secretary,
of the Interior who is responsible for the administration
of the Trust Territory. The Task Force, consisting of re-
oresentatives o^ the Departments of the lnterior',Oefensc, :
State and Health, Education, and Welfare and observers
from the NSC and Bureau ) the Budget, had considered and
recommended several steps for greater aid to the area,
both through the increase appropriation ceiling(fro« I?
to 17.5 millions) and in legislation {H.R. "3198): now pen-
ding in the Congress. It also proposed the sending of a
survey mission to the Trust Territory to conduct a more
thorough sMy of the area' s major problems.

3. The Mission's formal instructions from the President
(through NASM No. 243 of May 9, 1963) were to survey the
political, .economic and social problems of the people of
the Trust Territory and to make recommendations leading
to the formulation of programs and policies for an accel-
erated rate of development so that the people may make an
informed and free choice as to their future in accordance
with US responsibilities under the trusteeship agrees

4. The Mission consisted of nine men, bottf
and non-G.oy = rr.-.ont, selected by its chains..

f.
rnsient
ervint;

>rir:' rericd^

8f?eks in*

Territory during July and August 19G3. The Mission vi-
sited six district centers in the territory and represen-
tative sample ot the outlying islands containing in all
g majority of the area's population. Discussions were
held throughout the area with seven assemblies of local
people, eight legislative committees," seven municipal
councils and three women's associations; about twenty-
five interviews with American missionaries and over forty-
five interviews with lilicronesians were held. There »*ere
also briefings by Headquarters personnel of the Trust Ter-
ritory government and the "si* district administrators and
their staffs. Wherever possible, roads- communications,
transportation facilities, agricultural developments, sch-
ools and other facilities and enterprises.. were examined
and evaluated. Several additional' weeks sere spent in
the US preparing the final report of the Mission.
>>■ ? i n£_Oh-ject_i ves and Considerations

~ 1." Working within its broad frame of reference, the Mis-
sion's major-' findings relate to three key sets of- ques-
tions that it attempted to answer:

s. 'Ihat are the elements to consider in the pre-
paration for organization, timing and favorable
outcome of a plebescite in Micronesia and how
Bill this action affect the long-run problem
that Micronesia, .after affiliation, will pose
for the US?
\>, What should be the content and cost of the min-
imum capital investment and operating. program
needed to insure a favorable vote in the pleb-
iscite:, and what should be the content and cos-
of the maximum program that could be effective-
ly mounted to develop the Trust Territory tost "'
rapidly?
c. ihat actions need to be taken to improve the
relationships between the current Trust Terri-
tory government an; Washington ana to insure
that it can implement any necessary political
strategy land development program with reason-
able effeciency and effectiveness.
2. The Mission's findings and recommendations on these
three sets of questions correspond to Parts 1, I) and 111
of its report. Those recommendations sum up to an integr-
ated master plan smith, >f acceded, would 'provide guide-
lines for Federal actuu u ' ouor fiscal year 1968 L s*-
r.ure the oh i'ec lives „-r:

"'::*

a. Winning the plebiscite anc making Micronesia <
Jnited States territory urtv i i resistances
which will: (1) satisfy somewhat conflicting
interests ot the lilicronesians, the LIN anc the
JS along lines satisfactory to the "Congress; (2)
be appropriate. . to the present political and
other capabilities of the lilicronesians; and. (3')
provide sufficient flexibility in government
structure to accomodate whatever measure of
local self-government the Congress might grant
to Micronesia in later years.

b. Achieving rapidly, ■minimum but satisfactory so-
cial standards in. education, public health, etc.

c. Raising cash incomes through -the development of
the current, largely crop-gathering subsistence
economy.

3. There are, however, unique elements in the delicate
problem of Micronesia and the attainmentof our objectives
that urgently require the agreement now of the President
and the Congress as to the guidelines of US ac +inn "v n r
the next few years. First, the US will be moving counter
to the anti-colonial movement that has just about comple-
ted sweeping the world and will be breaching its own pol -
icy since Iforld War I of not acquiring.' new territorial
possessions if it seeksto make Micronesia a 'US.' territory..
Second, of all eleven UN trusteeships, this will be 'the
only one not to terminate in independence or merger with
a continguous country,' but in a -territorial affiliation
with the administering power'. 'Third, as the only "stra-
tegic trusteeship," the Security Council will have juris-
diction ever the formal termination of the trusteeship
agreement, and if such a termination is voted there, the
US might have to decide to proceed with a series of act-
ions that would make the trusteeship agreement; a dead is-
sue, at least from the Micronesian viewpoint. Fourth, "the
2,100 islands of Micronesia are, and will remain in the
now foreseable future, a deficit area to be subsidized by
the U.S. fifth, granted that this subsidy can be just-
ified as a "strategic rental," it will amount to - more
than $300 annual per Micronesian through 1968 and any red*
duct ions thereafter will require long-range programming

-long the lines of a master development plan as proposed
i n the Mission report. Finally, this hoped for long-
r,>ng e reduction in the level of subsidization and tne in-
dentation of the political strategy and capital invest-
ment programs through fiscal year 1968 require a modern
,m more efficient concept of overseas territorial aom-
nv.sfration than is evident in the prevailing approach of
the quasi-colonial bureaucracy in the present Trust Ten-
ri lory government.

-a ■ ~ i Political Development of Micronesia

The e
re mem

lover

foe Washington policy, adopted last year, of having
Taist Territory affiliate permanently with the US has
pad an observable impact on the Trust Territory gov-
wnt, American and tiiicronesian officials in the area
nr still to be thinking in terms of independence for
ronesia as an eventual, distant goal and there appears
•■ave been little attempt to direct Micronesia toward
-«ing about eventual affiliation with the US. In the
erce of further action, the Mission believes that the
entuci of previous attitudes and policies which did not
olve the concept of affiliation will be hard to over- .

'. it can be stateAguite unequivocal y that the masses
ICi. rcr.esians are not only not concerns with the ooli-
,3i *uf are but also are not even aware of it as a ques-
yr,. T rev simply live in the present real ity of the
riencan time" that has replaced tne "Japanese time."
arlier German and Spanish times are dimly, if at all
tiered.

The situation is not quite the same among the poli-

eUte. Political c/nwer amm the Micronesuns is

triumvirate of the traditional clan chiefs, the ethio

ycrn*^ b^^a^rac^ •*»<■« wv$ \n ^e '"Wist It; r ■-"■.. i

nment and tie small but powerful group'of businessmen

iting trading companies. These groups are aware that

■ political future io still to be resolved, .but 'even

General 1 y shy away from activel y concerning them-

: c uiith if The reason lies in their belief **§ '

■■

■+..

la) they cannot stand alone now and that independence,
even if they want it, is so far distant that meaningful
consideration is not practical: (b) there has been no
indication from the US of an alternative to independence
- they do not know that the US may desire affiliation;
and (c) even if affiliation were possible, the prospect
creates feelings of uncertainty and insecurity that they
would rather not face. ^

<t. These inscurities arise from general ignorance as
to what afniiition means and what it mould do to their
lives as they know them today. The more important of the
traditional chiefs are especially concern.-' whether "com-,
ing under US laws" *- u ld -.validate the present restric-
tions against non-Micronesians owning lac* N^fc' d
would affect tneir oompl icateo communal land-tenure sys-
tems on which their social organization and customs and...
■Hv. c,W<tV oowp'" are hased. The merchant businessmen,
even though they want more economic development,: react ■■ a-
gainst the prospect of a flood of American ousinessmen
with whom they believe they cannot compete. TheJicro- ■
nesians in the government bureaucracy are less feaHui of
permanent affiliation but they also share in the genera]
concern among the political elite they don't. want to be
swamped by Americans and lose their status "as the Hawai-
ian s : r!id."

5. On the other hand, there is a sophisticated aware-,
ness among a goodly member of the w i crones ian elite that
their own interests are not best served by the UN trust-
teeship simplv because, as a provisional non-nprm^nent
arrangement, i perpetuates the e'cussively depots' osy-
chology and habits of a people who ha.e hc-n handed -
round amonq fcu r maior ;'■«•■ ■ in 'ne 1-j^t F^ k e.vs. li ere

■ also appears to be an unexpressed but fairly widespread
and awaleable »fo' ; oml fee 1 ing amon- ,l ^n more sophis-
ticateo Wi crones 1 ans that they want an "identity" ar.u a
permanence of status that is not compatible with the im-
plied ifnpermanenee of the trusteeship.

6. Another disadvantage of the trusteeship i; its pro-
tective and custodian nature, a carry vor freri, fh° philo-
son h v h*' thp League of Nations maoda+as, whir. 1 " -of
fully compatible with the more recent empoasu on modern-

i z a t i o n and' more rapid' development of people: on J -

trusteeship. Most policies which try to be both develop-
ment-minded and protective do not seem to do a good job
of either. However, a conflict between development ob-
jectives and protective attitudes characterized the cur-
rent administration of the Trust Territory. Although it
has become fashionable for American officials connected
Kith the Trust Territory to disclaim any desire to main-
tain an "anthropological zoo," in reality t^otective and
custodial policies are very prevalent. This conflict
* t thin official thinking faithfully mirrors tne dilemma
of the Mi crones ians themselves. They desire urgent econo-
mic development, but want to retain, at the same time,
restrictions on non-Bicronesians immigrating, occupying
land and starting businesses. T he Mission believes that,
► if for no other reason than that of the impending, plebis-
cite, the Mieronesians need reassurances on the continu-
ance of those restrictions but, at the same time, *e are
recommending certain modifications which will initiate
long-run liberal izaf ion of those restrictions.

7. Another factor of importance affecting the plebis-
cite is the economic stagnation and deterioration ot pub-
lic facilities that has characterized the US administra-
tion of the Trust Territory in contrast to that of the
Japanese. The rapid growth under the Japan- ■ was due
not only to their large capital investment and subsidy
program, but to Japanese government-directed c ruz;>+ion
by Japanese and Okinawans. The fact that it was the Jap-
anese rather than the Micronesians who supplier f he labor
for the then flourshing sugar cane and commercial tjsh-
i nc ind-jstfif?. and w^i Vne^'w*- «-oso^«m the ^Sa^o^es-e
government's subsidization of the area does not alter the
fact that per capita Micronesian ..av incomes were :
three times as hiqh be f nrf> iV #ar ^ twv ar? no* •■."■!
that the Micronesians freely used the Japanese-subsidized
extensive public facilities. For the outcome of the
of the plebiscite to be'favorable the Mission believes
there must be an effective capital investment program be-
fore the plebiscite to give the fdi cronesi ans a sense c*
progress to replace the deadly feeling of economic dor-
mancy.

8. While rare than 95 pea en* oi •he huoee o? tne :
Trust Territory government is fir ->!••-• . '■!■> «"1 the
importance o* those funds in inf luenu ><"• ^ tavo-at/o
r l P >i -i-ti-- r^oli is. '^ ' % + ■ i.\acc of "3 lihd. 'm"
been lessened 'by: (a) consioer.-! 1 -!,. +<=- ; ii rf > ^->« *,"^>--
nesian bureaucrats that a large pa~t (actual !y over 12
million) is sper* cm high salaries for US personnel m
Micronesia; (b) numerous complaints about, ind dissatis-
faction with the cumpetence of the Trust' Territory go-
vernment (one district congress advised the Mission thai, :
despite area need, they did. not want more LIS funds if
they were no + "properly administered real experts who
should be. brought ■"in"); and (c) some believe that US aid
results. orily-'trjbin-'tJN at*' - and that Micronesia might not
do as. te.U'as a tlS territory.
■9. 'The Trust iem-. . .overrmient gets good marks frost
it* Hi cronesi ans, however, for its genuine fostering, fn
democratic civil liberties and increasing the participa-
tion of Microhesians in various levels of local govern™
ten + (as territorial advisory council, six' district. 'le-
gislatures and a multitide of municipal '(JovorniBftnts}. How-
ever, Micronesia is still a long way in- terms ot exper-
ience and funds from bei-c able to mount a v-iable local
government. The very multiplicity of Toca! governmental
levels is beginning to cause problems, particularly at
tne municipal level where tnere is much -d'i satisfaction bei~
cau^' ' t.p relization that, in a laroe majority of
cases, the *U,S. imposed" municipal taxes prefers only
enoggh <•< /»nue ^o pay salaries to municiDal officials and
count; ilmen for making decisions that the village
previously made + rae as a public service. This is...?
clear case ot t oo riuch government.
10. The great '^stances, cultural and linguistic bar-
riers separating ] hs. six districts of Micronesia also
have special implications for a plebiscite. Fi.e $<<■■■■
found little consciousness among the people of rr.e.Tn.':.!
.Territory of themselves as "Microti. •■ •>" am t<o eM"L'.~
al nationalistic feelings. There >r» *) ^^"it-nr- ;.;'■
jttiT,' hu + "a + hpr a 't -+-,.-; *f i'li i.'il is'l»d i ;'* j>*
ff.pre is almost univ n -sa' ignorance ,r a 1 -' iisi
who *"e the. leaders, political oth^ri; -.-:«, t-f t y j V. ■.
five districts, ana there is Mr i> ,r,c ,• .+ com-
promise on a district's spec' a >-, .-n't ii -

territory's advancement as a whole. This regional sepa-
ration is strengthened by the -existence of separate! dis-
trict legislatures, and to date only minor progress has
been made toward a central t.^fid indigenous government. The
"district legislatures function "Reasonably weMhg&tso, the
small revenues they can command, but they represent con-
servative bastions for the maintenance of traditional
policies, and land and social customs. Within some dis-
tricts, especially Yap and Ponape, there is the additional
complication of the outlying island groupings resenting
the domination of the islands nearer to the district cen-
ters. This situation requires the most carefully impar-
tial handling by the OS in the period before the plebi-
scite and the avoidance in the plebiscite of questions of
special interest to particular districts, such as "union
with Guam" which is an issue in the Marianas. !t also
creates the need for the right mix of political compro-
mise in the organization of the territorial legislature.
(The Mission's report, in Part I, identifies the particu-
lar issues, political groupings and key people of impor-
tance in that district.)

11. The Mission has no difficulty in concluding that
there is little desire for independence in the Trust Ter-
ritory. It sould go so far as to say that even if a
plebiscite were held today without preparation, the total "'
vote for independence would probably be only from 2 to 5
percei.t. The Mission also concluded that there is no
hard core of feeling against permanent affiliation with
the US but, as described earlier, an inchoate insecurity
among a substantial number of the elite that can be al-
layed only through certain actions recommend below.
12. The Mission recommends that the plebiscite be held
in 1967 or 1968 because:

a. Our timetable calls for creation of the true ter-
ritory aide legislature in the fall of 1964 and
having its members serve out an initial three-year
term before the plebiscite, during which the mem-
bers from the different districts can develop more
political experience working together than was
possible in the present territory-wide advisory
council.

b. The maximum impact of the recommended capital in-
vestment program will not be felt until late 1967

Q r - '■■■<■ oris ;-.:nd, nor ,::: it '.^ iVit a? ctrcnqiy
&-■»>■ "-.r,.H -,ince t h.'.' Mi'V.nr :oe-. '■■.■t e <['■-"' the
<tev"' ;;.p«!:: • • ■ ■ • ■ ■■..■•>■ ■■».- *-- •■ '

S>ic^-o ; i 4 .. --conOiTy I. a ; - sir-'„.;q pnO;r to offset

t" ■ •■"'■: '->■;■■:-.'.-■: -.■:,■:* i ■■ *■• cdP'*al investment
pro]'dr>! i'r.y r- S c-. : ,.;3' 1 958 ay w: : >c- time trie
Mr--- ir ■<■•.■■ i •; ;; a [m '. :: 1 .-.?:■:■.■ ■/ e'iucat :o^ , puolic
heal'-: arc ai/aiic xcr>< nil] .. 37e been n><-- ; ).
c. Ire oariy infinitive r-rsc ! 'j t ion c" the noMtical
fi.^re of h!icrorie:>.:i a-, a u'j ter'r;iory ■#;'! make
r ?<;.-; ; -er •■■:,■- i'--e Ja, i: it -o ut-c'des, to permit
Jdoani'-e ~j . r.-a st-en. ■^■■; i 'r\z\. l nz and f: ■■■:■■ w^ ves-
sels '•• •■■jr-ionsitive area? of tae Trust 1 e !-■••'-
to-, which i.Ci.1': supMy a very gr;a' sI'hjuIjs tc
economic Joveiopment a 4 no ccst to the US and
inereuy oemi: reductions in the US subsidization
of the territory.
If necessary, the plebiscite could be advance-' to as
early as 1966 by compressing the schedule for the deve-
lopment nf the legislature. '•■•• i^i. ' ,• .• • ■ ■■
created by the spring ct 1964 if the H igh Cowissioner
were instructed to do so. ^cuever, sucr &- advance ir
the plebiscite tiding wauid •:■■■■ at the expense of giving
the 'eaislature less experience and not waiting for the
capital investment program to have its *ul! imoact.
13. The questions offeree in the plebiscite +o the Mi-'
cronesians snoulc be confined to + *o in number ;>jih sowa
such genera! koH^i- y follow:

(a) Are you in favor o* becoming an independent na-
tion/
ib) Are you in favor of a permanent affiliation with
the LiS of America?
There will oe some nations in the UN ■*• n i r L> , sensing cur
objective, will ci aim that the ole-iscite should be con-
fined to the single option of indepem°nr.. ,-,;e tne ba-
sic idea of trusteeships i- -'-at they should terminate in
^dRDendnnc.p. There may al r .o -« some nn-ions which will
claim that, in its 1967-68 state of development and de-
pendence Micronesia cannot reiiiticai ly choose independ-
ence and is therefore not being given real alternative.
To some extent, this latter argument could be nullified
by including a third plebiscite option ■•- namely, cp-
tinuation for the time being of the status quo of the

s ihe administering power. From
d raises the vote for permanent
rcent of those voting to a s,;-
er.tage, although still a ntajor-

trustsesh:?- ** i t h in 3 US
our v; , ,it this i-.iu
affiliation fro* 95 ^
stantiallv ssaller par
ity,

14. the fiiission -commends the following steps as part
of the overall pragrauto achieve our plebiscite object-
ive and at the same Mine promote the longer tuft political
development and general advancement of the Micronesians:

a. A qualified American should be appointed in each
of the : six districts to develop and maintain con-
tinuous liaison with the various leaders of the
three politically critical groups. His main job
would be to develop, in a -gradual way, interest
among those . people in his district in favor of
permanent affiliation by supplying the informa-
tion needed to eliminate their, ignorance and al-
lay ; their fears ss to what the affiliation woultl?
entail, as well as its advantages. He would a : lsg|
administer useful adult education and US ..!r>§|
world information programs, as well as the loc;-
radio programming' now handled by the district
director of education, these six information of-
ficers, in whose recruitment US Information Ser-
vice should cooperate, would also perform through
their supervisor at Headquarters the regular
political reporting function so acutely lacking
at present, '

b. Washington should facilitate the general develop-
ment of Micronesia interest in, and loyalties to,
the US by various actions, three of which are:

(1) Sponsorship by the Department of State
of Micronesian leader visits to the US.

(2) Introduction in the school system of US
oriented curriculum changes and patriotic
rituals recommended in the section of the
Mission's report -dealing with education.

(j) increasing ths number of college scholar-
ship offered to &iicronesians ; ■«. highly
Sov.sui'-'s .issua in tli-3 II..

c. The Comunity wet ion Progra.n by the- GO Peace
Corps volunteers recommended in the Mission re-
port should be begun because it is of critical

importance to both ti.o pMhi:. U- :-M i ■ uaec ii:d
the overall advancement 0' ihs '.-j'vi'y of Micro-
nesians living on is]?: - ids cutj.r': v'-; district
centers.. The program as reccs.-j.vded (s-'hich in-
cludes use of Peace Corps Volunteers ?.s teachers
in the school system) and the realities :f Micro -
nesian needs contain all the probabilities of a
spectacular success for the Peace Corps.
Preparation should be taken to offer f.ii crones i an
government employees and other wage earners two
specific inducements l o ^eek affiliation witn the
US. first, jr+nr such an affiliation Bicronestin
anc uS personnel ^asic pay scales wcu.o ne ec^i ■■
ized. Since the ireaual ity exists only in tlw
professional anu-nig.ncr administrative echelons,
the cost would net be excessive. Second, mther
than introduce a retirement program for Micrones-
jian government employees, the Social Security
[system Should be ^ < tended to all wage and salsry
[earners in Micronesia 'most of whom are govern-
ment employees) with possi:'- 1 ^ -n- ; -ie^at i or- a f 1
simultaneously '" a* a

. 1 nc ! usi en

v . m j^. r'TSi ore c^nprj

HKea3 ,a+er t,mfi -
15. 'he final factor of importance to the outcome of ths
plebiscite will be the Micronesian leaders' insistence on
knowing the proposed organization of Micronesia's post-
plebiscite territorial government. The Micronesian lead-
ers are intelligent and in. many cases quite sophisticated;
and they have been led to- expect eventual independence:
their willingness to produce a large popular vote fnr
permanent affiliation will partially depend on the lei-
sure of self-government to be given them within the struc-
ture of territorial affiliation. This will also be ■■;';
c »" ; ■*■ ; ■" a 1 imoor+arrf ;* thp MM since *'■ •• .eloper, ,-; ;; .
reement requires "independence or self-government" as -M-:
terminal objective. On the other hand, consideration must
be given to the need for continued adequate control -.:,-
the US and th* traditional attitude of the Congress to-
ward the organization of ter-itorial government. Aim,
there are l.mi limitations on the present-day abiiitv
of +h e Micronesians to aovem themselves.

As the practical solution of this many-prongsd diis.'-.v;-
tne Mission recommends a government organization f or ;.;:.-

t:

territory of Micronesia that gives, on the one hand, a
reasonable appearance of self-government through an elect-
ed licronesian legislature and a Micronesian Chief Execu-
tive nominated by and having the confidence of trie legis-
lature, but on the other hand retains adequate cof' rn '
through the continuation of an appointed US High Commis-
sioner. (This arrangement is similar to that now op-ra'-
i ng in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands.) The
powers of the High Commissioner could range from:

(a) The minimum of being able to wiihold all or ,-,
oart of the US funds going to the. Mi c ronesi ■
government and the authority to declare mart; •
law and assume all legislative and t-^cr '-ve p-a,
ers when the security of the US so reo^'es: +c

(b) the maximum additional power of vetoing 2.! lar
continuing the Chief Executive's ap. ointments' c f
key department directors and dismissing fhe Chie
Executive and dissolving the legislature at ar
time.

15. The Mission also recommends that, after the plebi

■CiHif:-

^

C

I*

sciie, the Congress recognize the expressed desire of the
people of Micronesia to affiliate by granting them the
status of US nationals but that action on an organic act
'•"'•>: un+i" r ... ; .- P - • j/Iqo - ■ . -..,;,-' pip. ■ ' o
i'e territory has efficiently advanced, an- *"e ' e ■'•''-
torial legislature has had a cnance to take action on
the Local customs, and laws which now protect the lands
and businesses of Micronesians. Once the people of Micro-
nesia have expressed, their desire to affiliate, it is
nighly advisable that they feel the question of their
political future has been definitely resolved by having
the Congress grant them without delay the status of US
nationals even though there may be subsequently protract-
ed debate in the Security Council over the termination of
the trusteeship agreement. It is worth pointing out that
the extension of the status of US nationals appears to
the Mission, although questioned by State, to be legally
possible under the trusteeship agreement which permits
the extension of all the administering authority's laws
to the Trust Territory, and that this could be the *irst
in a series of steps that could make the trusteeship ag-
reement an academic issue, even if the Security Council
sere not wilting to terminate the trusteeship agreement.

UNLU-'

&

-Y--..

i y

Looking

P6 tl

the

given
i a and

tc

eyond

the plebi sc « and the subsequent

terr

torial statu? fc>; Micronesia, whai

e pos

jible long-run political future for

i an

j most assent.. ,1 .: ns iderat i on might

e uni

)n of the- two tet. stories of Mi cro-

iion, transporta-
sonomically viable
canomic develop-
a union wouici in-
of negotiation and «ould
However, ine payoff would

its
Such

nead in regular governmental i
tion and other facilities, ib)
area along with a new stimulus
stent, frontier in the Pacific
volve a ver)' delicate problen
require consistent pressure.
be a substantial reduction in the need for appropriations
as these deficit areas came to stand more and more on
their own feet. (Part II of the Mission report includes
recommendations for immediate action to eevebp the econo-
mic interrelationship between Guam and the i rust Terri-
tory.)

The even more distant problem of what ultimately, if
anything, could or should be done with the unifiec ter-
ritory of Guam and Micronesia is at present too much in
the realm of clouded crystal ball gazing. Incorporation
as a country in the State of Hawaii has been suggested in
various places, and the Governor of Hawaii apparently
feels that it is very much a possibility, but the Suam-
anian and Micronesian leaders' long-run political specu-
lation definitely do not contemplate this degree of ab-
sorption and loss of political independence. Furthermore,
the ultimate status of this territory may very *ell not
be decided separately but as part of a general solution
devised by the US for all our remaining territories.
Part II. The Capital investment Proqrai for Uveran de-

velopment

1. Until fiscal years 1963 and 1964, when the Congress
authorized an appropriation of $17.5 million for the
Trust Territory and appropriated $15 million for each of
those years, the level of US appropriations for Micrones-
ia had averaged slightly under $7 million annually. Out-
side of new transportation facilities, few new capital
investments «ere possible within this budget and those,
mere achieved at the expense of an overall net capital
disinvestment — that is, by permitting the deterioration

15

pyhHC taCl

The

.iostruc

ich

sf.f i 1 iat.ion of
]rams that
in fie Diet

id Nav

fhfi ;

;tra-

an+ inherited fr'ora fr>e Japane
imply evident u
/ expensive "economy",
hy the US T o s.;'ui; jdou'* the ,.- rmaneni
ronesia requires the formulation of v,ro-
:11'have Doth the maximum political- rmpa'c.t ■
■;te rind i sili also advance the Micronesians
in r>:,- h...p'i rur. as rapidly as possib;e toward s-insfacto-
ry iiving staraaros. A successful initiation o f Tf,e eco-
nomic development oi the area is. critical no f only to the
piaoiscite and the livimj standards of the people whs
iOLiid cecome 1)3 nationals but also So eventually ^'^i-
ing the l>$ of the financial burden of subsldinng* those
1 iving standards.. ■". ,

3. T he hulk of the increased, funds in -fiscal year 1963
and 1 'hi is Dei ng used in a program dust starting for the
Cicnsi-fjctio" am) operation of an expanded and accelerated
signen+arw school system. In vie* of the remar.ade de-
gree »o .^icr sducat'ional opportunities art- almost des-
parate 1 y wanted by ali classes of Micronss:ans 'including
sjrpr-1'.-ina 1 »- the most traditional-minded clan chiefs )
this priority of funds *as exactly right by every 'criter-
ion of US objectives. _ .' . ""

k. The Mission found, however,- an unsatisfactory state
■:/. affairs in the trust territory government with respect-
to tne development of the overall size and the .components '
'of an integrated capital investment and operating 'program
tiVeludino the educational' sector) that would meet frust
Territory needs 'in the, .fr-ara&aork ot US objectives, i^e
M i gh Commi ssl oner • himself believes that the $5?- million.
loos-range capita! program briefly presentee cy rim to
ire Mouse interior Committee last year was not- based an
so adequate stud/ of sectoral needs and priortie-s within
those sectors to achieve, the most favorable developmental
and pol itical impact.

5. The Mission members therefore proceeded within the

short time available to identify the specific sectoral,

social and economic "capital need ana feasibilities in the

■'survey of each of the six districts. Simultaneously, the

Mission members surveyed the policies and administrative

,-.i£'%5v

problems specific to each of the sectors and those that
c-.cio probably arise in connection with an overall cap;-'
tal investment and development program. The Mission then-
A'orked out the overall priorities and their interrelation-
ship and formula*-^ Hip - ytna 1 program. '•* . „•■ ■ ..• .-,
feasible and efficient maximum, given the differing dis-
trict labor avai .dpi i itibb and t-ner resuurces. Ibis max-
imum program totals $42 million of capital investment
over the four fiscal years from 1965 through 1968 with:
annual operating costs ascending $14,5 million in 1965 to
815,9 million in 1966, $18.5 mil I ion in 1964 and $20.2 ■
in 1968. The Mission a'so presents, at the -other end of:
thp scale, the minimum proqratn i+ be 1 isves sufficient
'u acnieve- US political developmental oojectives -wniui..' , : ,,-
volves somewhat inferior educational and other standards
and slower economy i-.rvelopmer:. I ne minimum program to-
tals $31 million of capital investment over the -four-war-
period and somewhat lower operating costs than the ^.x-
i mum prnqram.

f. Tr Iook it if in various perspectives, the maximum
r-'-im ; s a ;mai; program, e* ep* in education, relative
to the ,n^,;,-«ent made by tre Japanese government: before
Korld S/or II. The $360 average per capital annual expen-
diture that it represents is not very meaningful in. the
Trust Territory with its 61,000 people scattered through:
a vest area, but it is closer to the small per capita ex-"
penaiture of Brit ian and France in their Pacific colonies :
(under SCO) man it is to the Mgn per capita expenditure
(11,300) of small Denmark for the 23,000 inhabitants- of -
Greenland. Also, in view of our political objectives, the
program snould be viewed in relation tc the Mi crones i an 's
average per caoita income of about $80 per year -- the
equivalent of $36 in "939 prices - compared to the com-
parable 1939 Micronesian average of about $100. Given the ■
rate of ins-ease in me population of Micronesia (about
3.5 percent annually) and the almost negligible impact of
current technical assistance efforts, "• jnorctc -u-e~ '
vel-opment proolem will not be-solved except with some
su^r, capital -investme: ; program such as that presented "in
the report.

17

tima
are:

Is. a en i . I "

2.4 "
0.9 n
5.0 "

1.5 "
2.7 "

13.0

2.5 "

te

The M.vor : - T ;.-,•..' u rpi- *r t* tre op-
capital investment program from 1955 through <96i
LUn.dtior,
Health

Public safety and judiciary
Economic Development Fund
Transportation
Communication and radio
Public Works
Equipment replacement
Housing ass's + an-
The small percentage of the proposed program devoted to-
economic development .fleets -- wnicr *.-- ^ dJimms-
-a^v a recommended Economic Development Fund —
come extent to the anticipated response of pri- :
,ate«cronesian and US capital. However, it is primarily.
^T- ( --Tion of the Trust Territory's very limited- abil ity-
re use such funds effective 1 v, given its meager production
resources and tiny, dispersed markets. The limited pms-
pecis tor the growtn ui the private ecomony dictate thatt
for the foreseeable future this mill continue to be a defi-
ri» ,-..;, -'r^* : '^^tp.r--- ■ n - 4 hf- development :! -a+ wil' result
from the proposed cr^-am. Prospect: wou 1 ' '• "-t-iqbter,
and toe oost-1963 need for subsidization reduce if Wash-
i Mr ,,-vi.ld b" Mil 1 ., i to cancel US import suties on pro-
cessed +ish ( a privilege enjoyed by American Somoa) and
tc oiii'-inate, af- f ' 'he plebiscite, entry restrictions
' e>.cept in the Kwa jal ei n area) on Japanese bir. ; " ' ""■ ■■'.
m--;.:"icians and n. , vessels. And in the still more
•'■.■uct future, although not now foreseeable, wnat iOQks
V\-,s a "Mi crones i an Folly" -- justifiable only for its
; V alue -- may very well develop into a viable
>ased on American residents and tourists.
; re 1 arge part of the c a p i + a 1 ^nvest-'ment program, and
i-Kp p i9n larger part of the annual operating progran, de-
voied t educa+^n reflect toe auute need a- ■ " ■ ■ -m
importance o^ that orogram. But, given the limitations or
the feasible rate of ecomomic development, it also poses a
^'."m.u. Modern education, particularly secondary educa-
-1 r ., Ail! c-eate = demoralizing unemployment problem as
graduates refuse to return to their priwtive cutl/ing
lands and to the extent that they are not aided to con-
tinue on the college, it is essential that the safety valve

St

IMll

-- ..»

of legally unlimited (and possible f inancially-aiaeo , im-
.mi-.' :Hon ^n fhp US be es+ahl i shed. Fortunate' -,, +hat\

would come to pass when the Mieronesians are given US §

national status, if not sooner.
' Par; Ml. Administration in tne i rust lerntory

1. The Mission regrets to report that a major obstacle
: to the overall development of the Trust Territory is the

creaky functioning of the quasi-colonial bureaucracy in
the Trust Territory government. Unqualified American v 4 -
.ficials with remarkable long periods of bureaucratic long-
evity, many from the days of Navy military govern 1 - ■ ■,
; are more the rule than the exception. There is -a- real
.and present danger that increased appropriations by the
Congress will -not be used with maximum effectiveness and
l hat the Trust Territory government cannot implement the-
program- needed in the area, increased numbers of per-
manent personnel in the Trust Territory government staff
::■: assumed by too mnr\\) *.*<>»<• t»nvtj y«aAs V -"sou -rany
•a-e: to constitute the needed "expansion of programs".

2. The Mission believes tWt a v\««i> a^j-roocW t« ter-
ritorial administration is required i f the Executive and,
+ he Congress want results.. This should be the conscious!

i effort to utilize the services of other Federal agencies
: or to contract, out the implementation of the 'new -and : ex-
: -p.and-ed programs recommended in this report. Based on its.
survey, the. Mission .is convinced that results will be..
: quicker and; the- overall and : long-run costs of such a pol-
icy cheaper/ To • vist a few examples, the Mission
_ : recommends that the recruitment of American teachers be
I provided for through a contract between the High Commis-
* sioner and the State of Hawaii, that the provisiorrof
<j American physicians be contracted for with "Medico", that
I a private consulting organization provide advisory ser-
vices in connection with the administration of fhe pro-
posed Economic Development Fund and that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service take over immigration (unc-
tions in the area.
: .there has. been sufficient exploration by the Mission to

he WTlin tr 1 v • .' f '* *''>-• -."rirr-, 1 ( 1 fi y i f-, < 1 j t -, i -)-— i n

ittost cases the particular willingness of the suggested,
agencies and:, contractors ' to.'.unde- 1 '- 1 '- ^hose functions,;
Contract supervision *ill pose ixs own set of r^hletns
x " iU ~ t,.. .a. T er ritory government, but it 'can . ancle

these problems more reaaily. To charge Vr- H Trust Terri-
tory government with tr.e task of implement i no with i u
own staff a relatively large and complicated program will
not only irvclove many years' delay ana mucn waste, out
■sill saddle that government (and the US) with the costs
oi permanently swollen bureaucracy necessarily recr-. :, "o
in mcny cases without full qualifications owing to the
ore. ,.ie of time. The need for many of these contractual
services will desappear as certain programs are completes
ana others are increasingly staffed by qualified Micro-
nssiaso.

3. The Trust Territory governmental organization of
functional departments at headquarters in 5a i pan and ir
t ; . ii-itrict administrations headed by district ad-,
nnistrnlors j s basically sound. However, there is a
serious prool-m of communication between headquarters de-
partments and their district counterparts partially aris-
ing from the over-central izati on of authority in the High
Co:n:ni ssi oner's office. Essentially, the High Commis-
sioner uses his department heads as staff officers, and
they have no real operation authority delegated to them,
nor are they permitted to deal directly *' lh it- pi r dis-
trict counterparts nor with the district administrators.
Furthermore, it is alleqed that tne diitr^oc «fcy*M.stra-
tors frequently alter professional tecw^oi ^&&<>** and
programs. The Mission believes U>a' in the interests of
better administration of both the pre-.,, o ...,.ite territor-
ial ocvernm.ent, that the oeieqa'lon of powers by the Higr
Corvus ioner to his department heads be permanently clari-
fied. Ihfc headquarters department directors should be
qiv"n professi onal and technical responsibl i+y for their
programs, beginning with Departments of Education, health
and Agriculture, and management specialist should be sent
to the Trust Territory to spell out the specific steps t c
accc.tpl is 1 ' this objective.

4. Budgeting in the Trust Territory government is sim-
ply a means of setting a ceiling on expenditures rather
than a planriiin mechanism through which programs are de-

VPlope! tno rv L r 'r p ' f er ' ' ." il . . • "" f> i r " -■:"■■ ,c

cod serious' deficiencies in both budget formulation one
*••!.' ••, < r d thy accuunting of expenditures. The MIE-
S' ••Cu5i"-"nds various specific measures among *nic- j-'
heouirioo the full funding of construction projects btsrt-

n

mg in the Ft 1965 budget and separate accounting for js-
iness-service operation including payment for such ser-
vices as the Trust Territory government receives.

5. Due to the long supply lines back to the US and in-
adnuate funds, the Mission serious supply deficiencies
(particularly in medical supplies and spare parts) at var-
ious points borough the system. The Mission recommends
cert u r. lunging and management actions.

5. Under UN pressure and our own response to if, the
policy of replacing American officials with Micronesians
has .--o pressed to the point of using poorly qualified
Micronesians. The Mission has investigated various pos-
sic.r- training „-.„.,, :i1 ,., -lo t.^t Uv; s pr ..«?*, a^ w*,-;
specific recommendations regarding training for public
administrations, teachers and medical practitioners.

7. The Mission recommends in reaard to American person-
al + : • t^^'.t ■ •^';<r m : i ) y, i P ' i .- H . 1 „. . p .„,.,.. ! a _

ted, that the Department of Interior adopt a compulsory
roid->«o program a<v* Uo'. rue u^tciur,, : e^ce^on, V ut>-
lic health and engineering and construction :• upgraded,

8. The ultimate objective should oe a sin,
nel system where American zr.<. Micronesian otfici-als in
similar positions receive equal basic pay. In the in-
terim and as a measure 'to reduce friction and encourage
Micronesian officials to complete their full education,
the Mission recommends the adoption of a new transitional
schedule in the Micrones i an pay ^ale '" senior :^-'cc_
siona; j' * icials who meet evey qualification retirement
for comparable araries in the Federal civil service, unce
a uni+ied personnel system is established and the Social
Security sys'tm ;> extended to territorial employees, the
new American employees entering after that date should
hav< territorial-employee status rather than Federal em-
ployee status, unless they are detailed from a Federal

9. The policy and administrative relationship between
Kahington, especially the < Department of Interior, and
the Trust Territory government must be sharply improved.
There has been, on the part of *asii i ,-sgton. both insuf-
ficient guidance as to ■ .:,- policies asd p: ngram objec-
tives anc a lack of review in depth ot the Tpjs: Terri-
tory government's administrative : -, ■ 1 ^ ■ : ;... ■ .„ n of 'nem,
A major re^v: terry . ■... _,,- >■ >■■.■.■: \r-,.j~, < v,^

■*'S

22

i- the Trust Territory government somesshat as a sovere-
ign foreign government. This is in the Mission's opinion
an unnecessary and inadvisable interpretation of fw ad-
ni peering poser's role in the Trust Territory. One im-
portant wwnpie o* *^se Micie"Hes ^ + ne lack of fam-
iliarity by ^any high officials in the Trust Territory
»iH the policy sHft contained in NASfri U5 and the
H m« «-^ •«■ ->*** Pr^he^v oo'irv *+.-,Wr.+ ^
have sufficient impact on the Trust Territory govern-
ment policy. To correct the general problem, the Mis-
sion recommends:

a. The Task Force created 'by NASM 1 45 should con-
tinue up through the plebiscite as a program ar-
policy advisory group to the Secretary o' "•
terior. They should be involved in the adoption
of a "master plan" of priority programs a- ' per-
iodic review in Washington of the progress as
«ell as approving any later modifications.
b. Annual visits of an evaluation team to the f ••
Territory to assertain by field inspection, that
the "master plan" is being implemented in acco
ance with the terms of reference approved by >
ington. The 'earn should serve tne Secretar ■ of
the Interior, t^ut the Task Force might a k the
Secret,-.: y nv. 'tie Interior in nominating, the mem-
bership of the team, and should of course have
WW o>c«s* to t hp <^wrl <s + lK * ***** *° e such
action as it considers appropriate. If the
*.«<^«> a.^^^o.\ o%vx,i A oi<»n to tonciis. ^^"^e
I rust Ter-i+c^ 6«wprnment's budget ■ forraiiS«Kv.<a<\
it would further issue the implementation o*yw«
"master plan" and would faciliate the mo*-*, s^v
tensive budget examination by Interior Uia^ is
needed.
c< THp v\v^v C - mm i-s;. loner siwy^4 v*. loooxotpd tov *>*
Secretary of the Interior rather than the <"«=» ;
jent practically because of certain legal ,anomal
ies involved in tne position bein„ ;:i e tr-ough
a Presidential appointment, but primarily to
fucus responsibility on the Secretary for the cc -
tinuing guidance of the administration of th-
Trust Territory.

d. The Sscretary of interior should issue an order
clarifying the e v nct po*pri delegated to the High
Conrf!!t,siop'ier and those reserved fo tne St-^r'it ary
in accordance with the itrj" jppendeo to the Mis-
sion report.

«W